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Abstract. Gait is a relatively new biometric modality which has a pre-
cious advantage over other modalities, such as iris and voice, in that it
can be easily captured from a distance. While it has recently become a
topic of great interest in biometric research, there has been little investiga-
tion into gait spooﬁng attacks where a person tries to imitate the clothing
or walking style of someone else. We recently analysed for the ﬁrst time
the eﬀects of spooﬁng attacks on silhouette based gait biometric systems
and showed that it was indeed possible to spoof gait biometric systems by
clothing impersonation and the deliberate selection of a target that has a
similar build to the attacker. These ﬁndings are exploited in this current
work for developing new solutions to cope with such possible spooﬁng at-
tacks. We describe then in this paper an initial solution coping with gait
spooﬁng attacks using part-based gait analysis. The proposed solution is
thoroughlyevaluatedon thechallengingUSOUgaitspooﬁngdatabasecol-
lectedwithintheEUTabulaRasaproject.Thedatabaseconsistsofrecords
of 22 subjects (14 male and 8 female), between 20-55 years old, walking
through the Southampton tunnel in both their normal clothes and whilst
wearing a common uniform. The obtained results are very promising and
point out very interesting ﬁndings which can be used as a reference for de-
veloping more enhanced countermeasures by the research community.
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1 Introduction
Biometric gait recognition refers to the recognition of people from the way they
walk. This has recently become a topic of great interest in biometrics research.
Compared to some other biometric modalities, gait is potentially beneﬁcial since
it can be acquired from a distance and it does not require contact or client
cooperation. This makes it an attractive option in video surveillance applications.
Current state-of-the-art systems show that it is possible to recognise peo-
ple using gait recognition by using silhouette or model based approaches [8].
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Both approaches start by analysing video data to detect the walking subject.
Silhouette-based approaches have enjoyed the most success. In particular, those
which use the averaged silhouette have proved most popular [9]. Feature set se-
lection has been deployed to identify which features of the silhouettes contribute
most to recognition [13]. Early model-based approaches used pendular models
to calculate the variation in thigh inclination, when walking [3]. This work has
been extended to a uniﬁed approach which can model running or walking simul-
taneously [14]. More recently, these models have been employed in conjunction
with vertex based location. This approach tracks and describes people by the
motion of their joints. Such model based approaches have also been subject to
feature set selection, which revealed that motion components can have greater
discriminative ability than the structural components. A further area of research
is the eﬀect of the camera viewpoint relative to the subject’s walking direction.
By assuming that the human is a solid object, walking in a periodic fashion along
a linear path (for two gait periods), recognition can be achieved which is invari-
ant to the direction of path relative to the camera [2]. The covariate factors are
of equal concern and there is interest in the degree that external factors impede
recognition by gait. Analysis of covariate factors including clothing and footwear
has shown that wearing a trench coat or the wearing of ﬂip ﬂops can signiﬁcantly
aﬀect recognition performance [1]. This is not surprising in that the wearing of
clothes that obscure the whole body will naturally obviate any gait biometric.
In addition, the walking style consistent with ﬂip ﬂops is known to diﬀer from
that when wearing normal shoes, though no research has parameterized this ef-
fect. As such, the current state-of-art has been to investigate the nature of the
within-class variation, and the between-class variation in gait as a biometric. It
is interesting that the earliest approaches achieved recognition rates exceeding
90% and this is matched by the most recent approaches on databases extend-
ing to 300 subjects. Much of the earlier work was conducted on data acquired
using controlled conditions whereas later recognition has used data acquired out-
doors, which has resulted in slightly lower recognition performance. There are
many databases for evaluating progress in gait recognition research such as HiD
(NIST, US) [10], Soton (Southampton UK) [12], and CASIA (CAS, China) [15]
databases. The earliest databases contained data from only tens of subjects,
sometimes wearing speciﬁed clothing. More recent databases include many more
people, outdoor as well as indoor data and variation in camera viewpoints and
illumination.
While gait recognition has become a topic of great interest in biometric re-
search, there has been little investigation into gait spooﬁng attacks where a
person tries to imitate the clothing or walking style of someone else e.g. in order
to gain illegitimate access and advantages. Perhaps, the most appealing approach
to use computer vision techniques to analyse the spooﬁng attacks against gait
biometric systems is to replicate the silhouette of the target e.g. by wearing cloth-
ing that makes an attacker’s body shape appear the same as the target. This is
probably the most straightforward and unobtrusive method for performing the
attacks especially against silhouette based gait recognition systems which haveImproving Gait Biometrics under Spooﬁng Attacks 3
been the focus of much of the existing research and on which the ﬁrst commercial
gait recognition system is currently being based.
The only prior work on gait spooﬁng [4] uses wearable sensors but not video-
based analysis: the spooﬁng attacks were performed against an accelerometer
based gait recognition system where users needed to have devices attached to
their legs in order to obtain a gait signature. The main conclusion is that gait is
potentially diﬃcult to spoof as it is behavioural and encompasses the whole body.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there was no prior work on gait spooﬁng
from visual data until our very recent work [5] which analysed for the ﬁrst
time the eﬀects of spooﬁng attacks on silhouette based gait biometric systems
and showed that it was possible to spoof gait biometric systems by clothing
impersonation and the deliberate selection of a target that has a similar build
to the attacker.
In this present paper, we exploit our recent ﬁndings in [5] revealing the vulner-
ability of gait recognition to spooﬁng attacks and introduce the ﬁrst countermea-
sure in the literature to cope with such threats (i.e. gait spooﬁng attacks). We
describe an initial solution using part-based gait analysis. Our solution is based
on the observation that the overall human body has various types of informa-
tion to be extracted and selected for gait recognition. Body shape (built), overall
body movement and body limbs movement patterns could greatly contribute to
gait recognition. In case of spooﬁng attacks, these types of information may be
altered to attack the system. Our proposed solution is thoroughly evaluated on
the challenging USOU gait spooﬁng database collected within the EU Tabula
Rasa project. The database consists of records of 22 subjects (14 male and 8
female), between 20-55 years old, walking through the Southampton tunnel in
both their normal clothes and whilst wearing a common uniform. The obtained
results are very promising and point out very interesting ﬁndings which can
be used as a reference for developing more enhanced countermeasures by the
research community.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the work in [5]
and gives a thorough analysis and additional results on the vulnerabilities of gait
biometrics to spooﬁng attacks. Section 3 describes our proposed countermeasure
to cope with gait spooﬁng attacks. This proposed solution is then thoroughly
evaluated in Section 4. Discussion and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Vulnerabilities of Gait Biometrics to Spooﬁng Attacks
To gain insight into the vulnerabilities of gait biometric systems when confronted
to spooﬁng attacks, we considered in [5] a dynamic texture based gait recognition
method which eﬃciently combines the shape and motion cues and preliminary
evaluated its performance on the gait spooﬁng database recorded at the Univer-
sity of Southampton. The main focus was on analysing factors that may have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on silhouette based systems, in particular on how clothing can
be used to spoof a target. Clothing spooﬁng was chosen as it is one of the most
straightforward and inconspicuous factors that an attacker can use to alter their4 A. Hadid et al.
gait silhouette. Our analysis was focused on the simplest form of clothing-based
spooﬁng attack, that of wearing the same clothes as the target. For secure envi-
ronments where legitimate users have some degree of uniform, such as hospitals,
scientiﬁc research establishments, banks etc. this attack is likely to be necessary
to evade detection from human security monitoring such as CCTV.
2.1 OULU Baseline Gait Biometric System
The dynamic texture based gait recognition system [6] of the University of Oulu
(Finland) uses 2D dynamic texture descriptors, namely Local Binary Patterns
from Three Orthogonal Planes (LBP-TOP), to describe human gait in a spatio-
temporal way. A video sequence of a person’s walking is thought as spatio-
temporal volume. The LBP-TOP description is formed by calculating the LBP
features from XY, XT and YT planes of volumes and concatenating the his-
tograms to catch the transition information in spatio-temporal domain. Gentle
AdaBoost is used to perform feature selection and to build a strong classiﬁer.
The system works as follows. Firstly, a video sequence of a persons walking
can be thought as spatiotemporal volume. The volume is partitioned into sub-
volumes. Using the sub-volume representation, motion and shape are encoded
on three diﬀerent levels: pixel-level (single bins in the histogram), region-level
(sub-volume histogram) and global-level (concatenated sub-volume histograms).
Secondly, LBP-TOP description is formed by calculating the LBP features from
XY, XT and YT planes of volumes and concatenating the histograms to catch
the transition information in spatio-temporal domain. The LBP-TOP features
from each sub-volume are extracted and concatenated to encode motion and
shape characteristics. Thirdly, to use the multi-resolution information, original
uniform patterns are improved with ordering sampling points according to the
sampling angle, by which they will also produce codes that satisfy the bit tran-
sition condition and any number of sampling points can be used on diﬀerent
LBP kernels. Fourthly, the length of the LBP-TOP histogram representation
can be quite large depending on the number of sampling points and number
of sub-volumes that are used. A better and more compact representation can
be obtained by using feature selection methods. Gentle AdaBoost was used to
perform feature selection and to build a strong classiﬁer. Instead of building
a classiﬁer that gives the identity of the person from one sample, a two-class
classiﬁer was trained, which classiﬁes whether two samples come from the same
person or not.
2.2 Gait Spooﬁng Datasets
The Southampton gait database [11], one of the largest gait databases, is con-
sidered for experimental evaluation. The database contains multiple views and
detailed camera calibration information. The database consists of recordings
of subjects walking through the Southampton Gait Tunnel (see Figure 1) at
least 9 times. Each recording consists of 8 synchronised video sequences of ap-
proximately 140 frames. 113 subjects were randomly selected for computing theImproving Gait Biometrics under Spooﬁng Attacks 5
baseline performance of the system i.e. the performance when the system is not
confronted to spooﬁng attacks. Nine recordings of each of the 113 subjects were
used, one for enrolment and eight for testing. This leads to one enrolment video
f o re a c hu s e ra n d8 ×113 test client (positive sample) videos for each user. When
producing impostor scores all the other clients are used, yielding in 8×112×113
impostor attacks.
Fig.1. Southampton Gait Tunnel
To analyse gait recognition performance under spooﬁng attacks, new data
(referred to as USOU Gait Spooﬁng Database) has recently been recorded at
the University of Southampton [7]. This consists of 22 subjects (14 male and 8
female), between 20-55 years old. The subjects were recorded walking through
the Southampton Gait Tunnel in both their normal clothes and whilst wearing
a common uniform (Figure 2). By having every subject wear the same clothes,
the degree to which one subject could impersonate another by mimicking their
clothes can be investigated. The uniform clothing appearance was achieved by
having subjects wear white overalls over their normal clothes. Each recording of
normal or uniform clothing was repeated between 10 and 35 times depending on
subject availability.
2.3 Resuls
For comprehensive analysis, we investigated diﬀerent gait spooﬁng attacks sce-
narios including (i) clothing impersonation, (ii) deliberate selection of a target6 A. Hadid et al.
Fig.2. Two subjects wearing the same clothes (common uniform) is used to investigate
the degree to which one subject could impersonate another by mimicking their clothes
that has a similar build to the attacker and (iii) combination of clothing and
target selection. This yielded in 4 protocols for studying gait under spooﬁng
attacks:
a) Baseline performance in which the original Southampton gait database with-
out spooﬁng attacks was considered by computing only client and impostor
scores. This provides the performance under normal settings.
b) Clothing attacks are calculated by comparing each of the uniform record-
ings of each subject against the uniform recordings of all of the other subjects.
This provides insights into how clothing aﬀects the performance.
c) Targeted attacks are measured by comparing each of the normal clothes
recordings of each subject against each of the normal clothes recordings of the
subject with most similar build. This provides insights into how selection of the
target aﬀects the performance.
d) Targeted clothing attacks are the same as targeted attacks except that
instead of using the normal clothing recordings the uniform clothing recordings
are used. This is equivalent to each subject selecting the person with the most
similar build and impersonating their clothing.
The results of our experiments are shown in Figure 3 in terms of detection
error trade-oﬀ (DET) proﬁles which illustrate the dynamic behaviour of the
gait veriﬁcation system as the decision thresholds are changed. The DET curves
shows how the false acceptance rate varies according to the false rejection rate.
The percentage of successful attacks is equivalent to the false accept rate of the
system when attacked. The lowest proﬁle (curve labelled baseline in Figure 3) is
that of the baseline performance when the system is not confronted to attacks. It
is important to gain insight into the eﬀect of the spooﬁng as our focus is on the
degradation in performance caused by spooﬁng attacks relative to the baseline
performance.
The curve labelled clothing shows the average false accept rate when attack-
ers replicate the clothing of their target but are unable to select which person
they are attacking. This curve shows that clothing impersonation does convey
a small advantage, increasing the Equal Error Rate (EER) from 4% to 28%.
The curve labelled targeted shows how eﬀective spooﬁng attempts are when anImproving Gait Biometrics under Spooﬁng Attacks 7
Fig.3. Gait biometric performance under diﬀerent kinds of spooﬁng attacks [5]
attacker selects a target that is most similar to them without also impersonat-
ing their clothing. In terms of equal error rate these kinds of attacks seem to
be less eﬀective than clothing impersonation. Finally, the curve that combines
target selection and clothing impersonation shows signiﬁcant raise in the EERs
compared to the baseline performance, thus indicating serious vulnerabilities to
such combined attacks.
3 Proposed Countermeasure to Gait Spooﬁng
We analysed in the previous section the eﬀects of spooﬁng attacks on silhouette
based gait biometric system. Our thorough investigations showed that it is pos-
sible to spoof such gait systems especially when selecting the person with the
most similar build and impersonating their clothing. We propose in this section
a solution to cope with such threats. Our solution is an extension to the dy-
namic texture based gait recognition approach by exploiting the following two
observations:
1. The overall human body has various types of information to be extracted
and selected for gait recognition. Body shape (built), overall body movement
and body limbs movement patterns could greatly contribute to gait recogni-
tion. In case of spooﬁng attacks, these types of information may be altered
to attack the system. Hence, the baseline system is vulnerable to altered
information as boosting did not learn from attacks and could potentially
over-ﬁt the training data.
2. The baseline system analyses the body in four divided regions. Based on the
type of spooﬁng attacks (target or clothing), the information extracted from
body portions could be altered. The overall histogram considers the overall
portion and combines the altered information of body portions that are more8 A. Hadid et al.
vulnerable to spooﬁng attacks to those carrying movement information than
body built and shape information.
Our ideas to solve the shortcomings of the dynamic texture based gait recog-
nition approach to better cope with spooﬁng attacks are:
– Prevent from over-training by employing histogram distance as the classiﬁer.
– Divide the body into multiple horizontal portions, as shown in Figure 4.
Fig.4. Block diagram of our proposed initial gait anti-spooﬁng solution
The gait recognition database does not contain camera and viewpoint changes.
Hence, we can divide the body into multiple regions to prevent altered informa-
tion from body parts that are vulnerable to spooﬁng attacks to be combined with
the overall information. We extract LBP-TOP features from each body part and
concatenate the overall histogram to separate information extracted from body
regions.
4 Experimental Analysis
To gain insight into the eﬀectiveness of our solution, we focus our analysis on the
clothing impersonation and combination of clothing and target selection. In the
clothing impersonation scenario, the attacks are calculated by comparing each
of the uniform recordings of each subject against the uniform recordings of all
of the other subjects while the targeted clothing attacks are equivalent to each
subject selecting the person with the most similar build and impersonating their
clothing.
The results of the experiments are presented as DET curves in Figure 5. In all
the experiments, the body is divided into 10 equal horizontal regions and LBP-
TOP features are extracted and concatenated to obtain 10 sets of histograms
as the resulting feature vector. In the ”clothing attacks” scenario, the results
in Figure 5 shows four plots comparing the baseline system ”baseline”, base-
line system under attacks, anti-spooﬁng system performance using the baseline
database and anti-spooﬁng system performance on the spooﬁng database. As
expected, these results clearly show performance improvement against spooﬁngImproving Gait Biometrics under Spooﬁng Attacks 9
Fig.5. The DET Curves of our proposed anti-spooﬁng solution and comparison with
baseline results
attacks but at the cost of slight performance degradation on the baseline dataset.
Similar conclusion can also be made on the results of the experiments for the
”clothing targeted attacks” scenario. Due to more challenging spooﬁng attacks,
the performance improvement is however less signiﬁcant than in the ”clothing
attack” scenario.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our investigations showed that it is possible to spoof silhouette based gait bio-
metric systems especially when selecting the person with the most similar build
and impersonating their clothing. Based on this ﬁnding, we described a solution
to improve the performance of a gait baseline system against spooﬁng attacks.
Our idea to solve the shortcomings of the baseline system consists of preventing
from over-training by employing histogram distance as the classiﬁer and dividing
the body into multiple horizontal portions.
The experimental results showed that our anti-spooﬁng solution increases sig-
niﬁcantly the robustness of the baseline system to spooﬁng attacks. For example,
the FAR of the baseline system drops from 80% to 20% at FRR of 10% under
”clothing targeted attacks”. Using our anti-spooﬁng solution under ”clothing
attacks” at FRR of 10%, the FAR performance gain was in the order of 45%
(as the FAR of the baseline system which was 60% dropped till 15% using the
proposed solution).10 A. Hadid et al.
It is worth noting that while the countermeasure to gait anti-spooﬁng in-
creases signiﬁcantly the robustness of the system against spooﬁng attacks, some
performance degradation on tests not including spooﬁng attacks can also be
expected.
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